We have entered an era in which the risks of discord, fragmentation and competition are manifest, and in which leading countries are buffeted by economic pressures and distracted by political divisions. There is a risk that among ‘established’ powers, short-term agendas and internal pressures will crowd out visionary, cooperative initiatives to increase global security. While ‘emerging’ powers increasingly have global interests and embody changes in preferences and priorities, they are not themselves necessarily prepared to assume responsibility for international order. Meanwhile, the current world governance structure suffers from tradeoffs between effectiveness and legitimacy. In these circumstances, the obstacles to productive international governance and reform are daunting.

Today’s security challenges are also increasingly diverse, differentiated and fragmented. Nowhere is this more evident than in the evolving problems of combating terrorism and the growing dispersion of global terrorist networks. However, the increasing dispersion and regionalization of threats are not confined to terrorism. Many of today’s security challenges are generated within individual societies, spread across borders to their surrounding environment, and exacerbated by unhealthy regional dynamics. Still others, such as the western hemisphere narcotics syndicates, originate on one side of the world but target and exploit vulnerable societies on the other side. To complicate the picture further, today’s security threats encompass challenges to human security and a whole series of social and environmental ills, such as pandemic disease, piracy, illicit trafficking and environmental degradation along with traditional military security challenges. And they occur in a time of bewildering connectivity and advancing political complexity as the world becomes increasingly and simultaneously interlinked and multicentric.

How is the world responding to these complex security challenges? As we argue here, new patterns of international cooperation are emerging which are largely ad hoc, informal, improvised and opportunistic. We refer to this new form of security cooperation as ‘collective conflict management’. The term itself is hardly new. Writing in 1993, Ernst B. Haas argued that the ‘remarkable record of the UN since 1985 is a case of adapting to new challenges and opportunities without rethinking the basic rules of international life or considering the very foundations of international order’. He recognized the obstacles, but advocated that the
US and other leading states support a UN-centred multilateral security system. The term collective conflict management (CCM) was broadened and developed in the late 1990s by the late Joseph Lepgold, Thomas G. Weiss and Paul F. Diehl to describe an emerging type of interstate and intergovernmental collaboration between NATO and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations. By late 2010 the wheel of conflict management had turned again, as global institutions appear to have their hands full. We are building on this earlier work to refocus and amplify the concept to take account of increasingly evident patterns of ad hoc coalition-building. The broadened concept covers a wider range of multilateral collective endeavours that includes the participation of civil society groups such as NGOs, professional bodies and task-specific international agencies, as well as regional organizations, individual states and international organizations working in dedicated coalitions to deal with non-traditional as well as traditional security threats.

The observations in this article grow out of a multi-year, multi-author study on regional security and regional conflict management. Experts from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Americas were asked to identify the major security threats to their respective regions and assess their regions’ capacity to address these threats. While the project was not looking for patterns of collective action outside the regional institutional context, the regional authors identified a number of examples of collaboration among various state-based, regional, global and occasionally non-governmental institutions in response to regional challenges. This result led the book’s editors to seek out other examples of collective conflict management. We see some common features emerging across these collaborative arrangements, and explore examples here that shed light on criteria for success or failure and raise interesting questions for policy-makers.

Unlike traditional approaches to security management, such as collective defence or collective security, which involve formal obligations to undertake joint action in response to the actions of an aggressive state, today’s cooperative ventures seem to involve improvised strategies of collective action, often in response to one or more of a wide array of diverse security challenges ranging from ‘traditional’ security threats such as the outbreak of civil war or regional conflict to ‘non-traditional’ threats such as organized crime, piracy, kidnapping, arms trading, narcotics trafficking and conflict-related commodity rents, as well as protecting individuals from gross human rights abuses. Faced with such

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4 For the classic discussion of these concepts, see Inis L. Claude, Jr, ‘Collective security as an approach to peace’, in Donald M. Goldstein, Phil Williams and Jay M. Shafritz, eds, Classic readings and contemporary debates in international relations (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), pp. 289–302.

5 See e.g. Bryan Maybee, The globalization of security: state power, security provision and legitimacy (Basingstoke:
challenges, states and sometimes regional groupings seek remedies where they are available—from international agencies, regional organizations, bilateral official or non-official partners, or joint ‘neighbourhood watch’ initiatives. This article explores why these new collective conflict management ventures have emerged, what effect they have had, and whether some principles can be identified that may lead to more effective action.

The changing global context of security management

Before examining these collective arrangements, it will be useful to examine the interrelationship between security and conflict management over the past 40 years, during which there have been significant changes in official and popular perceptions of security threats and conflict management responsibilities. When he wrote *Politics among nations*, Hans Morgenthau defined security in national terms: as the expectation that, through its ‘monopoly of organized violence’, the state would protect the citizen and the institutions of the state.6 In the succeeding years, expert circles generally framed security challenges as arising from the competitive power struggles between states, epitomized by the Cold War military and political confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

During the Cold War there was little official interest in conflict management—that is, the use of non-military means such as mediation, ‘good offices’ or pre-emptive diplomatic engagement to promote negotiated alternatives to violence and political upheaval.7 Although nuclear deterrence was underpinned by diplomacy and the credible threat to use force, conflict management was generally viewed in unidimensional terms. The dominant powers in a bipolar international system sought to ‘manage’ their conflicts in order to avoid a loss of face or strategic setbacks and to prevent their conflicts from escalating ‘out of control’.8 However, they had little interest in using the tools of negotiation, mediation and preventive statecraft more broadly to promote durable settlements, institution-building, good governance, development and the promotion of the rule of law.

The East–West conflict found expression in proxy wars—initially in Greece, then in Korea, Vietnam, southern Africa, Central America, Afghanistan and other places—but, with the exception of those in Korea and Vietnam, these wars were

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7 The definition given by ’Beyond intractability’ captures a common understanding of the term: ‘Conflict management involves the control, but not resolution, of a long-term or deep-rooted conflict. This is the approach taken when complete resolution seems to be impossible, yet something needs to be done. In cases of resolution-resistant or even intractable conflict, it is possible to manage the situation in ways that make it more constructive and less destructive. The goal of conflict management is to intervene in ways that make the ongoing conflict more beneficial and less damaging to all sides. For example, sending peacekeeping forces into a region enmeshed in strife may help calm the situation and limit casualties. However, peacekeeping missions will not resolve the conflict. In some cases, where non-negotiable human needs are at stake, management is the most feasible step.’ ’Beyond intractability’, http://crinfo.beyondaintractability.org, accessed 16 March 2008.
generally limited in scale and scope. While lip service was paid to the role of collective security instruments, such as the United Nations, in resolving conflicts, it was clear that the ability to freeze or manage conflicts lay with the powerful states, not with international or regional organizations. The UN’s conflict management potential was confined to those cases where there was some measure of East–West tolerance or consensus, and its actions consisted mainly of good offices, electoral support in decolonization processes, and ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations in consensual settings such as Cyprus, Israel/Egypt (the Sinai Desert), or Israel/Syria (the Golan Heights).

During these Cold War years, more interest in conflict management was shown by scholars, religious and secular activists, and others outside government who sought to popularize a very different discourse about national security. This discourse focused on the threat of nuclear annihilation as a consequence either of direct attack or of a ‘nuclear winter’. Proponents believed that ‘conflict management’ (more usually expressed in terms of ‘peace movements’ at the time) consisted of pushing their own governments towards arms control and then eventually nuclear disarmament, thereby reducing stockpiles and removing the weapons from national armouries. Such activity by civil society actors gained some traction in a few western countries; however, it was virtually absent within the Soviet bloc.

In the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, the world’s attention shifted from tracking superpower rivalry to witnessing the outbreak on nearly every continent of civil wars: wars that habitually spilled over state boundaries to contaminate entire neighbourhoods. Global security was redefined in local and regional terms, and the tasks undertaken to provide security widened to protecting civilians from massacre by their own governments as well as shoring up weak states threatened by struggles among factional militias. No longer was international security ‘indivisible’ as it had been during the Cold War. Instead, it became fragmented as governments, institutions and individuals attempted to address a wide range of security challenges and threats. Powerful

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12 There were also some East–West bridge-building exercises such as the Pugwash conferences, which sought to limit the nuclear arms race, as well as the Dartmouth process, which aimed at joint US–Soviet exploration of negotiated solutions to conflict.


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actors assumed a ‘third party’ conflict management role—often successful—in other people’s conflicts, and the UN undertook peacemaking efforts in Africa, Asia, Central America and Europe. A number of studies noted a decline in the outbreak and lethality of conflict.\textsuperscript{15} At least one report attributed this trend to UN engagement; others pointed to the embrace of notions of human security and a growing acceptance of the normative ‘responsibility to protect’.\textsuperscript{16} Conflict management became the business of large and small states alike. However, with the terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe in the 2000s, this global consensus broke down. The US and its coalition partners went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, big power politics came back to the fore, and the UN and other conflict management organizations were pushed aside. At the same time, according to data published by the University of Maryland, the steady decline in the number of active conflicts levelled off, and the current trend seems to be an upturn in armed conflict and violence in many countries.\textsuperscript{17} Many of the peace agreements that were concluded in the 1980s and 1990s to end sectarian strife have either failed, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and the Philippines–Mindanao, or are barely holding together, as in the cases of Nepal, Sudan and Colombia.

Many countries continue to suffer chronic instability because of persistent social, political and economic problems. This produces conflict patterns that are multidimensional, featuring a range of traditional and emerging features—sectarian and factional strife, criminal networks, state-building crises and regional rivalries. The annual ‘failed state index’, developed by the Fund For Peace and \textit{Foreign Policy} magazine, identifies some 60 countries as being at risk of political and economic collapse.\textsuperscript{18} At the top of the list are Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Guinea and Pakistan—large parts of Africa and the greater Middle East.

The fact that so many countries are susceptible to internal conflict and social disintegration suggests that there is enormous potential for instability in the international system. While these conflicts and global threats may have made the link between national security and conflict management more apparent to policymakers around the world, the countries and institutions that provided conflict management in the 1990s are either marginalized by current wars or overburdened by the number and gravity of ongoing crises. In this environment, major powers and international security bodies have scrambled for politically sustainable and doctrinally coherent strategies. The policy catchphrases aimed at generating the political will for action—such as ‘failed states’, ‘loose nukes’, ‘post-conflict

\textsuperscript{15} See e.g. the conflict database of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict, accessed 21 Oct. 2010), which record the decline in conflicts from 1991 to 2006.


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stabilization and reconstruction’, genocide prevention’ and ‘the war on terrorism’—have failed to capture public imagination or to mobilize consistent international action. As discussed below, the impetus behind collective action in response to security challenges is widely shared. The evidence clearly suggests that no one wants unilateral ownership of today’s security agenda. The motives behind this lurch towards collective action need to be unpacked.

The global response: collective conflict management

Moments of geopolitical change often produce new institutions as a response to that change.19 The end of the First World War brought the League of Nations, which attempted but failed to create a global order through international cooperation on security matters. The end of the Second World War produced a host of institutions, most of which still function today—the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Coal and Steel Community which has transformed over time into the European Union. However, the end of the Cold War did not result in much new global institution-building. Instead, the past two decades have seen existing institutions adapt their missions and doctrines, expand their membership, and engage in a series of agonizing reappraisals of their identity and purpose. The G7, founded in the mid-1970s as the group of the wealthiest, most developed countries with an initial focus on financial and economic issues, gradually moved into terrain of a more political and security-oriented character. Over 20 years later, in 1997, Russia was invited to join the group (a possible consolation prize for having to stand aside and watch NATO and EU expansion). By 2005 leading European members were pressing for the inclusion of emerging and developing nations, and the so-called Outreach Five (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa) joined some of the proceedings. By this point the meetings were addressing everything from finance to terrorism, African development, climate change and the scourge of paedophilia. Meanwhile, since 1999 the G20 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors have developed into the premier body for consultation on governance of the international financial system, and G20 summits of heads of state began in 2008.

Advances in financial sector governance have not been matched in the field of international security. At first, the late 1980s and the 1990s seemed to mark a new era of the United Nations as the global mechanism through which conflicts could be monitored, managed and resolved. The institution had some notable successes in all corners of the world—Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador and, more recently, East Timor. The success rate, however, was matched by a ‘failure rate’, as the UN fell short of effective action in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and

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Haiti, and was marginalized in the face of the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 and the consequent American decisions to attack Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, scandals and inefficiencies plagued the institution, and calls for its reform were joined by calls for its dissolution. Serious and well-intentioned reform efforts made modest headway, but were deflected by political disputes and a lack of underlying consensus among leading states and groups of states.\textsuperscript{20} NATO, the most effective of Cold War institutions, has often seemed caught in a bramble of self-doubt, as questions about its mission in the post-Cold War environment are heard both inside and outside the organization. Every ten years its guiding ‘strategic concept’ becomes subject to review and examination.\textsuperscript{21}

The 2009–2010 review cycle, which culminated in Lisbon in November, embraced a broad array of goals and missions, but has probably not resolved the organization’s Afghanistan dilemma or the internal contradictions among members.

Instead of building strengthened global security institutions, the general international pattern has been to cast doubts on the relevance of established ones. The UN and NATO were not dismantled in the post-Cold War period, but they were weakened as much by a thousand cuts as by any direct challenge to their mission. Instead of innovation, we have witnessed expansion, dilution and confusion. This history raises the question, however, of whether the world needs another institutional approach to conflict management and security. Would a new institution be capable of responding to the complex challenges of present-day conflict? Do we understand the nature of the challenge well enough to design a capable institution?

While there may be growing recognition that local, regional and global security are linked and that national security is connected to preventing or managing conflicts, the exact nature of these links remains obscure. Also obscure is the road ahead as far as reform and innovation in global institutions are concerned. There are three reasons for this: first, there are huge political hurdles to real reform, as the example of the UN Security Council makes clear; second, security has become divisible, making the quest for consensus and coherence elusive; and third, many actors prefer that the current institutional endowment remains weak and imperfect.

Instead of looking to a new institution or a new set of responsibilities for an existing institution, we need to recognize that new collaborative patterns of behaviour are becoming apparent in the conflict management field. In these new patterns, approaches which depend on only one country or institution have been replaced by a growing network of formal and informal institutional arrangements that operate across national, subregional and regional boundaries. These arrangements occur for a variety of reasons—some encouraging, others less so—and the results appear to vary widely. It is important to understand these informal patterns of CCM in order to analyse why they may succeed or fail and what potential they have to reshape conflict management strategy.


Collective conflict management in action

The cases presented here—in Africa, Afghanistan/Pakistan, South-East Asia, Latin America and Europe—are quite different from one another in nature, dynamics and composition. Some are responses to specific crises; others are organized around ongoing attempts to foster peace in longstanding conflicts. Some are set up by third parties, determined to take action to provide security; others have been established at the request of the conflict parties themselves. Several cases illustrate the informal, ad hoc qualities of improvised response that first attracted our attention. Others involve formal institutions, but point to a high level of interinstitutional collaboration. None of them, arguably, would have developed during earlier historical periods.

Horn of Africa piracy In 2009, in response to escalating attacks by pirates on ships and merchant vessels crossing the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa, a combination of intergovernmental, regional, state and private actors mounted a collaborative effort to address this threat. Combined efforts to deal with piracy have involved joint, ad hoc naval coordination among key NATO, EU and coalition maritime forces; a major parallel role for the private sector, especially among those companies whose ships use these waters; the critical cooperation of Kenya in handling captured pirates; and more effective efforts by certain Somali non-state entities. Although there is no unified command structure among the three naval contingents, there has been extensive coordination at the tactical level in dealing with Somali pirates.

In a parallel development, merchant shipping lines have made improved efforts to protect their own vessels. Up to 70 per cent of pirate attacks are now being defeated by merchant ships’ crews themselves. As a consequence, pirates face significant risks and less likelihood of reward if they attack merchant ships. While Kenya has agreed to prosecute pirates who are apprehended, other regional states have lacked the necessary legislation or political will to cooperate with international efforts to provide legal support for direct naval action against pirates.

Interestingly, the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1851 (2008) authorized and endorsed—in everything but name—the voluntaristic, ‘neighbourhood watch’ characteristics of the ongoing response to the Somali piracy challenge. Specifically, it called upon ‘States, regional and international organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia’. It also invited ‘all States and regional organizations’ engaged in the fight to conclude special arrangements with countries surrounding Somalia to allow for the embarking of ‘shipriders’ to facilitate the detention and prosecution of detainees. In addition, it urged the creation of an ‘international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy … at sea off Somalia’s coast’. Finally, it encouraged UN member states to ‘enhance the capacity of relevant states in the region to combat piracy, including judicial capacity’.
In a sweeping illustration of the new normative environment, the resolution went on to urge member states to collaborate with the shipping and insurance industries and the International Maritime Organization in developing ‘avoidance, evasion, and defensive best practices and advisories to take when under attack or when sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia’. The ad hoc, case-specific nature of this pattern of collective action is also spelled out in categorical terms aimed at limiting the impact of the Somalia decisions on the existing, rules-based international maritime order, while also maintaining at least a figleaf for Somali sovereignty.\(^{22}\)

Naval operations are ultimately no substitute for greater efforts to tackle the socio-political and economic challenges within Somalia. However, even here there has been some modest progress as a result of encouraging political developments in the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland. It is also now recognized that security sector reform is necessary, particularly in terms of building regional ‘brown-water’ naval and coastguard capacities. This does not mean that the threat itself has diminished. However, there is something of an evolving network of global, regional, and state and non-state actors cooperating to address the piracy problem.\(^{23}\)

The Afghanistan–Pakistan border dispute The Dubai Process—a cross-border CCM venture facilitated by Canada—offers another illustration of the kinds of networks that are being spawned to deal with today’s complex security challenges. Major, longstanding disagreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the issue of the Durand Line (which constitutes the de facto border between them) have for many years thwarted any kind of dialogue or security cooperation between the two countries on a wide range of border problems that include the cross-border movement of insurgents; the absence of proper infrastructure and customs management at key legal border crossing points (Waish-Chamam, Ghulam Khan and Torkham); the smuggling of goods between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the illicit cross-border flow of narcotics; and illegal migration.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) In outlining its decisions, the UNSC also affirmed ‘that the authorization provided in this resolution apply [sic] only with respect to the situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under UNCLOS, with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law, and affirms further that such authorizations have been provided only following the receipt of the 9 December 2008 letter conveying the consent of the TFG (Transitional Federal Government of Somalia)’: UNSCR 1851 (2008) at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 28 Nov. 2010.

\(^{23}\) One account summarized the 2009 CCM picture thus: ‘Three large coalitions of naval forces conduct counter-piracy patrols in the vast area: Combined Maritime Forces of NATO (Operation Ocean Shield); the EU’s NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta); and Commander, Naval Forces U.S. Central Command in Bahrain, serving as Commander Maritime Force for Combined Task Forces 151, which was led in recent months by Pakistani, Australian, Singaporean, and United Arab Emirates flag officers. Still, with only two dozen patrol ships on station, all manner of small ships or casual dhows can and do evade land-based and now sea- and air-based surveillance efforts.’ Nevertheless, in 2009 the combined maritime operations of NATO and allied forces disrupted 411 pirate operations of 706 encountered; delivered 269 pirates for prosecution under prevailing legal interpretations to Kenya and other jurisdictions (of whom 46 were jailed); and killed 11 pirates. The combined operations also destroyed 42 pirate vessels and confiscated 14 boats, hundreds of small arms, nearly 50 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and numerous ladders, grappling hooks, GPS receivers, mobile phones, etc. See Robert I. Rotberg, ‘Combating maritime piracy’, policy brief 11 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, Jan. 2010).
This initiative developed when Pakistan’s then President, Pervez Musharraf, threatened to mine the border in response to pressure from the international community to assume greater responsibility for controlling the country’s frontiers. Canada, a longstanding champion of the treaty banning anti-personnel landmines, stepped in to suggest an alternative approach to dealing with the myriad problems in the disputed border region. Since 2007, in keeping with the Potsdam Statement by G8 foreign ministers and the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan (and the Pakistan–Afghanistan Joint Peace Jirga), the two countries have met on a regular basis under Canadian auspices in a series of technical, working-level workshops to discuss cooperating on managing their border. The five working areas of what is now referred to as the Dubai Process (named after the Persian Gulf emirate where the first meeting took place) are customs, counter-narcotics, managing the movement of people, law enforcement in border areas, and connecting government to people through social and economic development. The meetings are now part of an internationally recognized process which not only promotes dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani officials but also advances cooperation in each of these areas. Importantly, the process has engaged and mobilized a wide range of partners and stakeholders not only in the two countries, but also at the international level, including the US Border Management Task Force in Kabul and Islamabad, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command (South), the World Bank, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, other organizations working on border management, and key donors such as Germany and Denmark.24

The Liberia peace process The 2003 Liberian peace talks offer another illustration of a CCM undertaking in a peacemaking context. Many international, regional/subregional and local actors and institutions supported negotiations to end a bloody and protracted civil war between President Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Party (NPP) and two rebel groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The negotiations, which took place in Ghana, were mediated by former Nigerian President General Abdulsalami Abubakar under the auspices of a subregional entity, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS had a strong interest in ending the conflict, both because it had sent peacekeeping troops into the country during the civil war in the 1990s and because the Liberian conflict threatened neighbouring ECOWAS members, notably Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire. Other international and regional actors participating in the negotiations were the US, the EU, the International Contact Group on Liberia, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations. In addition, the key parties attending the talks included Liberian civil society organizations which maintained constant pressure

on the negotiating parties in both Ghana and Liberia to reach an agreement. These groups represented interreligious interests, human rights, women’s rights and legal interests. Many had even risked their lives by travelling through an unstable Côte d’Ivoire to reach the talks in Ghana. Among the most forceful was the team of 150–200 members from the Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace group, which at one point even barred delegates from leaving the room during the course of negotiations until they had reached an agreement.25

Philippines–Mindanao talks The Philippines International Contact Group (ICG), established to support the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), provides an interesting example of collective conflict management in South-East Asia. The ICG’s assignment is to assist a Malaysian-led mediation process, building trust between parties, helping to monitor compliance with agreements, and providing expertise in and conducting research on matters of interest to the peace talks. Unlike the anti-piracy example, this group is the result not of third parties initiating CCM, but of an agreement between the parties to the conflict—the GRP and MILF—to mobilize additional external support and participation in the talks that reopened in December 2009. The state members of the ICG include the UK, Japan and Turkey. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), while not a member of the ICG, has ties to this group through Turkey. In addition, OIC member Malaysia leads the mediation, while fellow OIC members Brunei and Libya are participating in the international team which monitors the ceasefire between the GRP and MILF.

Interestingly enough, the GRP and MILF also asked two non-governmental organizations, the Asia Foundation and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC), to join the contact group, and requested that the Centre act as its secretariat. The Asia Foundation has a long history of engagement in the Philippines and in Mindanao, the governance of which is critical to the peace talks. HDC’s involvement in the Philippines is of more recent date and has focused on the conflicts between the government and the communist rebel group, New People’s Army. Its contribution lies in the fact that it specializes in mediation and facilitation, and can draw on its experience from other conflicts.26 Presumably, the addition of the ICG to the existing Malaysian-led mediation process will also add to the transparency of the process. While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this elaborate structure, the fact that the parties sought assistance from this diverse set of countries and institutions shows recognition that a variety of talents and perspectives may be required to manage a complex situation.

Western hemisphere mechanisms The OAS (Organization of American States) is the leading organization for dealing with security problems in the western hemisphere. Its work, however, is also complemented by a wide variety of subregional and ad

hoc groupings and entities, such as the Rio Group, the Guarantors of the Peru–Ecuador Treaty, and the summit meetings of hemispheric presidents and defence ministers—all of which have contributed significantly to building an environment in which conflict management is the norm. CCM norms are also reinforced by two bodies that deal with nuclear matters—the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Brazilian–Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency. Regional economic cooperative endeavours such as Mercosul, UNASUR and the Andean Community also help foster a common security agenda. These arrangements underscore the importance of formal institutional mechanisms and confidence-building instruments in the CCM equation because they contribute to legality, transparency and widespread political ‘buy-in’ from members through direct institution-to-institution partnerships.27

ASEAN-based Confidence Building Mechanisms Formal regional organizations can also serve as the launch pad or pivot for a wide variety of CCM ventures of the more informal variety that extend beyond the direct membership of the organization. ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) has established several forums for the promotion of regional security within the wider Asia–Pacific region, including dealing with ongoing or potential disputes. Among these are the ASEAN summit of member states to discuss and resolve regional issues and tensions; security-building dialogues with countries outside ASEAN, for example with China, Japan and South Korea in ASEAN+3 and with Australia and New Zealand; and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which comprises 26 countries including all the major powers plus the EU. The ARF’s activities reflect its strong focus on confidence-building and the creation of a sense of strategic community, as well as encouraging preventive diplomacy and conflict management. The explosion of bilateral and multilateral free trade and economic partnership agreements in the Asia–Pacific region also underpins the CCM enterprise by deepening the bonds of cooperation through rapidly growing levels of economic interdependence.28 At the same time, ASEAN and its outreach adjunct bodies have some potential to serve as a forum for airing and debating divisive issues and for bringing balancing pressure to bear against a powerful state, as Chinese officials have experienced.

Transnational law enforcement cooperation in south-eastern Europe The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) has worked to expand adherence to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and to this end has entered into partnerships with subregional police and prosecutors’ organizations. One subregional body—the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime (SECI Centre)—has been in existence since 1995.

Teaming up with these and other subregional organizations, the SPMU promotes adherence to the Police Cooperation Convention for South-East Europe, which fosters cross-border coordination to facilitate seizures and arrests of narcotics traffickers. Such cooperative activity has obvious potential for addressing other security challenges such as human trafficking, other forms of criminal business enterprise and terrorism. Given the evident linkages between criminal mafias, conflict prevention and conflict management, such law enforcement initiatives represent a real contribution to security. This cooperative model has potential for development in other challenged regions such as Central Asia.  

**A closer look at CCM**

As seen from these examples, CCM describes an emerging phenomenon in international relations in which countries, international and regional/subregional organizations, and, importantly, non-official institutions or private actors address potential or actual security threats by taking concerted action in order (1) to control, diminish or end the violence associated with the conflict through combined peace operations and/or mediation, conflict prevention and avoidance; (2) to assist, where appropriate, with a negotiated settlement through peace-building, cross-border management and other cooperative efforts and measures; (3) to help address the political, economic and/or social issues that underlie the conflict; and/or (4) to provide political, diplomatic and economic guarantees or other long-term measures to improve local security conditions.

What are the characteristics of these new, cooperative forms of conflict management? First of all, there are no universal rules of the road or consistent principles behind CCM. Consequently, this pattern of cooperation in international affairs varies according to the severity of the security challenges being addressed, who participates in responding, and who takes the lead in these ventures. A distinguishing feature, however, is that they tend to span global, regional and local levels in terms of their institutional and individual membership or composition. Many CCM ventures also typically involve a combination of public (intergovernmental) and private (non-state) partners.

In one sense CCM follows on in the traditions of collective defence and collective security (see table 1). However, unlike collective defence and collective security, which involve formal obligations to undertake joint action in response to the actions of an aggressive state, CCM is a voluntary and improvised form of collective action in response to any of a number of diverse security challenges,
ranging from traditional security threats, such as the outbreak of civil war or regional conflict, to non-traditional threats such as organized crime, piracy, kidnapping, arms trading, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration and conflict-related commodity trade.

Second, CCM ranges across a large spectrum of activities, as the examples above have shown. It tends to be informal (rather than treaty-based), improvised, ad hoc and opportunistic. Pragmatism reigns, sometimes (but not always) at the expense of the norms embodied in formal charters or alliances. CCM choices are also shaped by the national preferences of lead actors and reflect prevailing regional security cultures or norms. Stated in less theoretical terms, many CCM undertakings are make-do arrangements to deal with specific security challenges and immediate conflict management needs.

Third, CCM action is effective when one or more key actors at the official or unofficial level are prepared to take the lead and mobilize partners who are willing to support a shared undertaking. For example, NATO took the initial lead in mobilizing a regional and international constituency to address the growing problem of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Canada was instrumental in serving as a catalyst to promote a more cooperative regional approach to festering border problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Philippines

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### Table 1: Differing approaches to conflict and security management

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<th>Forms of cooperation</th>
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<td>Collective defence</td>
<td>State signatories to a treaty which is</td>
<td>Military threat from the</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Centralized, hegemonic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>rooted in a multi-party alliance</td>
<td>outside</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective security</td>
<td>State signatories to a treaty which is</td>
<td>Any military threat to one</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Centralized, oligopolistic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>collective and supported by an</td>
<td>or more of the members of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>organization, and does not draw lines</td>
<td>the organization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>to leave anybody out</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective conflict</td>
<td>Informal coalitions or networks</td>
<td>External or internal,</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Diffuse, shared, pragmatic,</td>
</tr>
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<td>management</td>
<td>of state, intergovernmental and non-state</td>
<td>traditional and non-tradi-</td>
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<td>and ad hoc (and opportu-</td>
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<td>tion threats</td>
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<td>Ad hoc, on a case-by-case</td>
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<td>basis, evolutionary,</td>
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<td>open-structure</td>
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Collective conflict management

International Contact Group emerged from the bottom up as a means of engaging a wide range of local and international, official and non-governmental partners to support the protracted peace process in Mindanao. Although there is an element of spontaneity to the way CCM ventures arise, these loose coalitions, if they are to be successful, require guidance and leadership from their key members as well as buy-in from the different partners. Beyond this, success would also appear to depend on other factors such as the level of effective consensus within the CCM team and the degree to which its members have the right skills and resources for the task at hand.

These observations lead us to focus more closely on the question of motivations and other ‘drivers’ that may account for the increasing recourse to CCM by decision-makers. A range of factors and a variety of motivations may bring CCM into play. Today’s security challenges are often multidimensional and require tools, insights, experience, resources and specialized capabilities that often lie outside the grasp of single-actor conflict managers. Individual states, coalitions, alliances, and international as well as regional organizations band together in collective activity in part because—as suggested earlier—they recognize the limits of their resources. Decision-makers also appear to recognize: the need to share the ‘ownership’ of conflict responses with others and gain legitimacy from others; the political benefits of acting (and being seen to act) on a broad basis of support; and the importance of including actors with specific skills and assets relevant to the security problem being addressed. Ever fewer national and organizational decision-makers choose to act unilaterally and to assume sole responsibility for any of today’s security problems.

Of course, there is a negative side to some of these positive drivers. The urge for collective responses may disguise a lack of firm commitment to see things through on one’s own. The readiness to borrow leverage from others could descend into mere ‘buck-passing’, in order to be seen to be doing something but avoid any real responsibility. Joining a collective enterprise may be motivated by a desire to show domestic audiences that the country is important and relevant without intending to do any serious heavy lifting.

In some instances, CCM ventures may be derailed by the conflicting motivations of regional/global partners that for various reasons are reluctant to see any variation from the status quo. This appears to be the fate of the Minsk group (comprising representatives from a dozen countries and co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States), which was set up to mediate a resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As Thomas de Waal, a close observer of this conflict, writes: ‘Although the Minsk Process has appeared poised to deliver success on several occasions, it seems stuck in a perpetual cycle of frustration and disappointment.’ Part of the reason for this is the presence of powerful Armenian diaspora communities in France, Russia and the US which are keen to see Armenia maintain its control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region and don’t want to jeopardize relations with Yerevan. Some believe

that Russia is also using the continuing dispute to exert pressure on Baku, which has been trying to reduce Russian influence over its energy sector and export markets. The EU, which could potentially play an important role in resolving the conflict, has been kept at bay by France and Russia, the latter having objected to the deployment of a full-scale EU mission.

Another ‘frozen’ conflict is the situation in Moldova, which has also defied any sort of successful CCM ventures via the OSCE or EU, because of the presence of large-scale criminal networks in the unrecognized separatist region of Transdniestria which are tied to Ukraine and Russia. Transdniestrian elites have shown little appetite for engagement in any kind of peace process bolstered by the presence of Russian troops, Russian economic aid and Russian sanctions against Moldovan exports.32 As both of these examples illustrate, in the worst case CCM translates into no CM at all.33

But CCM may occur not only because of the perceived benefits of collective action; it may also be the result of enablers that facilitate such action. Internet-enabled open architecture is one such enabler, as defence thinkers in the US, UK, NATO, Australia, Sweden and Singapore (members of the International Transformation Chairs Network founded in 2004) have argued. While the ideas germinating in the US Navy remain at a formative stage and are meeting predictable resistance, its 2007 ‘Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ outlined what may become seminal ideas that go beyond traditional naval roles to include cooperative maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response based on interoperability and engagement with a broad spectrum of US and international partners (official and non-official).34 Two years earlier, Admiral Mike Mullen, then US Chief of Naval Operations, proposed a Global Maritime Partnership centred on the vision of a 1,000-ship navy consisting of over 300 US ships and 700 vessels from partner nations that wished to be part of the initiative. Henrik Friman, a scholar at the Swedish National Research Agency, sees the 1,000-ship navy proposal as an early example of ‘WikiForce’, a new, collective way of organizing and sharing information and security tasks, based on transformational technologies and new modes of multilateral organization. Meanwhile, humanitarian and disaster response initiatives in which technology-enabled networks link a wide spectrum of official and non-official agencies are already a reality in some settings.35 Such ideas are not alliance-based and are not confined to joint


33 See the balance sheet on the pros and cons of multiparty mediation efforts in the authors’ ‘Rising to the challenge of multiparty mediation’, in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds, Herding cats: multiparty mediation in a complex world (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999).


Collective conflict management

training; in the maritime security sphere they represent operational collaboration on humanitarian issues that are increasingly viewed as part of the security agenda of major powers.

Some key caveats

When the political environment is supportive, networks of conflict managers can help to develop effective engagement strategies of negotiation and mediation that reinforce each other. They also have a key role to play in supporting peacebuilding and conflict transformation processes from their inception to their conclusion, including the implementation of formal peace settlements. These ad hoc ‘coalitions’, rather than any new institution, may be the best tailor-made conflict management instruments available for the job. However, there are some important questions to consider before applauding the emergence of these arrangements unequivocally.

First, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are uneasy at being coopted by governments and military authorities in conflict zones like Iraq and Afghanistan. While some NGOs specializing in conflict management, like the Crisis Management Initiative run by former President Martti Ahtisaari of Finland, have gone so far as to design communication systems for specific conflict locations so that military and civilian/NGO partners can work more effectively together, others have been reluctant to engage with governments, especially their military units. To make CCM initiatives combining official and non-official actors effective, the two sectors will have to agree on some general ‘rules of engagement’ that respect the status and special nature (and limitations) of NGOs. The NGOs, in turn, will need to decide whether or not to accept the constraints of operating in insecure locales and relying on others for security and physical survival. Improved networks among conflict management actors will feature a flattening of vertical hierarchy and a reduction in status disparity, especially (as previously discussed) when networks are linked to the resources of information technology. This aspect of modern CCM places a premium on the presence of key people who know their counterparts in different participating entities, who understand the arts of informal, lateral communication, and who are culturally sensitive. Research on the possibilities of cooperation and coordination among different types of third party intermediaries points to the importance of improved relations and communication while also identifying limitations and barriers to operational coordination.36

Second, we need to understand more about the durability of the CCM phenomenon. It is an open question whether CCM is a transitional practice—a halfway house to more formal, binding forms of cooperative action—or a step backwards because of the failure of existing institutions of conflict management to address collective security challenges. This is a significant issue. If CCM turns out to be an

ephemeral or half-hearted response to security challenges, if participants engage only in order to be seen ‘doing something’ about a problem, if they dabble at the problem and fail to ‘finish the job’, losing interest once immediate threats are removed—then CCM will have only a minor role in global security.

An interesting test case will be the longevity of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), founded in March 2003 and now ‘endorsed’ by some 95 countries whose act of adherence consists of officially subscribing to a set of principles. The PSI aims to detect and intercept WMD materials and related finance, and is described in official US statements as ‘a flexible, voluntary initiative geared toward enhancing individual and collective partner nations’ capabilities to take appropriate and timely actions to meet the fast-moving situations involving proliferation threats’. Emphasis is placed on ‘voluntary actions by states that are consistent with their national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks’. The PSI has principles in lieu of a formal charter, and it conducts operational and training activities rather than regularized meetings or summits. It has no headquarters or dedicated facilities and no intergovernmental budget. Interestingly, President Barack Obama has called for the PSI to become ‘a durable international institution’.

Third, there is great diversity in CCM practices and choices: national preferences and different regional ‘security cultures’ are two variables that seem to influence them. But it also matters a great deal whether powerful regional actors assert themselves in order to shape their environment. In today’s divisible security environment, it still matters whether extraregional states are available to help out as conflict management partners, as Canada has done in the Dubai Process. Clearly, we need a sharper understanding of the motives and incentives that drive states, international and regional actors, and NGOs to develop further their cooperative arrangements and doctrines. One driver may be the absence or uneven presence of global assistance and support to fill the ‘security gap’. The suggestion here is that regional or private ownership of conflict management roles evolves to fill a vacuum. A related driver may be the perception by local and regional actors that they have specific and unique attributes, skills and cultural insights that more distant, external bodies or states lack.

Further, each region has its own peculiarities and distinctive normative framework for cooperation. European norms shape much of the regional security agenda of the members and would-be members of Europe’s institutions, but not beyond this geographical zone. Cooperation in the OAS rests on a culture of regional self-help that is tied to subregional forums and networks of cooperation in Latin America. We also have to recognize that many evolving ‘global’ norms, such as the ‘responsibility to protect’, rest uneasily on the most fragile consensus and are not universally shared across different regions.

Fourth, in some regions there may be evidence of another driver: a sense of a developing incompatibility between the doctrines and normative priorities of global actors and those of regional states. For example, it is unlikely that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (or the Collective Security Treaty Organization) and the OSCE would place the same degree of emphasis on governance norms in approaching the challenges of combating terrorism and maintaining border security in Central Asia. African peacekeeping missions could be encountering a parallel dilemma: UN and western agencies and NGOs may have one set of conditions for achieving a legitimate ‘exit’ from military operations, and African leaders may have quite a different one reflecting the realities of patronage and ‘wealth-sharing’ in many societies.40

Additional drivers of regional innovation and capacity-building are to be found in reactions to perceived global ‘interventionism’ (under whatever guise) and the assertion by external parties (official or non-official) of the need to act on behalf of ‘universal’ values that may not, in fact, be so universally admired or respected. To some degree, then, collective conflict management—as it unfolds in individual regions—may be partly a regional response and a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of external policy and doctrine. When major powers seek to project their priorities into distant places, privileging a single issue such as non-proliferation or counterterrorism or anti-corruption, there will be pushback and a possible ‘opening’ for regionally defined CCM initiatives.

A final consideration is the prospect that some CCM ventures may develop without a legal basis or any agreed source of official authorization. While there are few, if any, examples of this happening, it is possible to imagine that improvisation could run amok leaving a potential minefield of unanswered questions: who is responsible when a CCM initiative results in (or aggravates) a humanitarian disaster, what laws apply to which participants, and who is financially liable for the direct or collateral effects of an apparently worthy undertaking? Identifying the questions is easier than finding answers. Placing existing international bodies ‘in charge’ of CCM activity would seem to contradict the basic dynamic behind the emergence of CCM and to devalue the source of its attraction to participants.

The CCM balance sheet

The world is very uneven in terms of regional capacities for self-determination in the conflict management and security spheres; and the nature of post-9/11 geopolitics makes CCM a strong reflection of the age. Many of the threats facing groups, countries and regions today are beyond the capability of any one actor to resolve, and no one really wants to own them. Hence CCM occurs within regions, between regions and global actors, and between neighbouring regions. Its operation in any specific instance depends on (1) the readiness of global actors to engage in regional conflict management; (2) the availability and power of non-official entities to.

make contributions across the spectrum of conflict prevention, management and peacebuilding; (3) the presence or absence of ‘lead nations’ to drive a response forward; and (4) the readiness of regional bodies and key regional states to seek external help when needed.

Any balance sheet on CCM should reflect the rapidly changing threat landscapes of different regions. If criminal business enterprises or Al-Qaeda are moving towards regional franchises or branches with local/regional roots, the CCM response will need to be similarly agile. The balance sheet should, however, also reflect the element of impermanence—that is, today’s arrangements in response to today’s challenge (e.g. piracy or WMD proliferation) may not be suitable for coping with other challenges that could arise tomorrow. This said, however, it is possible that CCM will become a seed of future institutional development. It has happened before: the European Coal and Steel Community was the germ of the EU; ECOWAS was the germ and incubator for ECOMOG; the Helsinki Accords were the seedbed for the OSCE.

In this fragmented era there is no common ‘cookie cutter’ approach to conflict management. Moreover, the main powerful actors are all—in one way or another—troubled by economic pressures and facing short-term political imperatives over issues of identity, employment, health, ageing, trade and jobs. In such a world, the degree of interest in working for a new global order is very unevenly spread. The international arena is witnessing something quite different from a new global order. CCM may not be pretty. But it is the best we’re going to get.